Richard I. Fine, PhD
18102 Jaguar Ct.
Tarzana, CA 91335
Telephone: (310) 622-6900
Facsimile: (818) 996-8512
E mail: email@example.com
April 18, 2013
Via E mail:
Senator Mark Leno
Chairman, Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee
E mail: firstname.lastname@example.org
Assemblymember Bob Blumenfield
Chairman, Assembly Budget Committee
E mail: email@example.com
Re: An Act to Repeal Section 2 of SBX 2 11 (Cal. Govt. Code Section 68220) and to Amend Section 5 and Section 6 of SBX 2 11 enacted February 20, 2009, effective May 21, 2009.
Dear Chairmen Leno and Blumenfeld:
Enclosed herewith please find “An Act to Repeal Section 2 of SBX 2 11 (Cal. Govt. Code Section 68220) and to Amend Section 5 and Section 6 of SBX 2 11 enacted February 20, 2009, effective May 21, 2009” which I, as a constituent of Assemblymember Blumenfeld, and representing other concerned California citizens and voters, encourage you to introduce, circulate and enact either as urgent or emergency legislation or part of the 2013-2014 Budget Act under consideration.
This Legislation is of tremendous importance and urgency as it affects all aspects of the California Judicial System and decisions rendered under it by judges and justices who received and are receiving county and/or court payments.
As examples, cases and appeals in the substantive areas of law affected are: (1) administrative law cases; (2) child custody and family law cases; (3) class action cases; (4) conservatorship and elder cases; (5) constitutional law cases; (6) contract cases; (7) criminal cases; (8) death, estate, guardianship and probate cases; (9) eminent domain cases; (10) environmental cases; (11) government abuse of power cases; (12) personal injury cases; (13) property cases; (14) regulation cases; (15) tax cases; (16) traffic cases, and (17) zoning cases, amongst others.
Due to the county and/or court payments to the judges and justices presiding over the cases or appeals in which the county and/or court which made the payment to the judge or justice was a party, witness in the case or party interested in the case, all orders and judgments by the judge or justice were void and null, for the reason of being a “fraud upon the court”.
Unless the situation is rectified, California citizens will be left with a judicial system filled with void decisions, orders and judgments accumulated over the past twenty five years since the mid 1980’s when the county and /or court payment system to judges began.
I. Summary of Legislation.
Each of you may recall that SBX 2 11was passed by the Legislature as Budget Trailer legislation in February, 2009 with only three dissenting votes within three days. It is appropriate to repeal Section 2 and amend Sections 5 and 6 of SBX 2 11 as part of the Budget process or as urgent or emergency legislation.
The subject of the Legislation is “judicial benefits paid to judges by counties and/or courts” which is the same as SBX 2 11.
The Legislation repeals Section 2 of SBX 2 11 (Cal. Govt. Code Section 68220) which is now moot.
The Legislation amends Section 5 by precluding those officers and employees of governmental entities who received retroactive immunity under Section 5 of SBX 2 11for taking “county and/or court benefits” “from serving in such capacity for which the immunity is granted, or any other state or county elected, appointed or pro tem office from the effective date of this amendment.” The impeachment of the judges for “misconduct in office” pursuant to California Constitution Article 4, Section 18 (a) and (b) effectively occurred with the granting of retroactive immunity from “liability, prosecution and disciplinary action” by the Legislature’s enactment of Section 5 with only three dissenting votes. The amendment provides the protection to the public interest for the granting of the retroactive immunity.
The Legislation further amends Section 5 by:
(1) clarifying that immunity does not extend to any governmental entity, officer or employee of a governmental entity who pays or receives “county and/or court benefits” to judges after July 1, 2008. In particular, judges who received “county and/or court benefits” commencing on July 1, 2008 or at any time subsequent thereto are presently subject to impeachment, conviction and entry of judgment pursuant to California Constitution Article 4, Section 18 (a) and (b); and
(2) requiring that the governmental entity, officer or employee of the governmental entity “must disclose such benefits and disqualify itself and/or themselves from any action or litigation in which the government entity is involved or engaged, from the effective date of this amendment, subject to the U.S. and California Constitutional rights against self-incrimination, at which point such rights must be asserted and the officer or employee must remove himself/herself from their position with the governmental entity until completion of their criminal trial on the payment of the benefits.”
The Legislation also amends Section 6 of SBX 2 11 by requiring annual reports to the Senate Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review, the Assembly Committee on Budget, and both the Senate and Assembly Committees on Judiciary from the Judicial Council.
II. Relationship of the Legislation to the Current Budget and the Budget Process.
Recently, the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court spoke to a joint session of the Legislature requesting that $500 million be restored to the appropriation for the Judicial Branch. In her remarks, she alluded to a loss of access to the courts if the money was not appropriated.
Such is not the fact. The Chief Justice neglected to inform the joint session that Californians have been effectively denied access to the courts through the denial of constitutional due process since the mid 1980’s due to the illegal payment of approximately $350 million from counties to judges before whom the counties were appearing as parties in cases, witnesses or interested parties.
Restoring $500 million to the Judicial Branch or even appropriating any money to the Judicial Branch will not solve this fundamental problem that the Judicial Branch does not have judges and justices who are qualified to serve under the California Constitution due to the judges having engaged in “misconduct in office” by having taken payments from counties who appeared or are appearing before them as parties, witnesses or interested parties.
Until this problem is resolved, California does not have a functioning Judicial Branch and no amount of money will cure the problem. It is not a problem of availability of courtrooms and staff as argued by the Chief Justice to the joint session of the Legislature, it is a problem availability of judges and justices who did not engage in “misconduct in office”, are qualified to be judges and justices and of removing the judges and justices who committed and are committing “misconduct in office” and preventing them from serving in the future as set forth in Article 4, Section 18 (a) and (d) of the California Constitution.
The Legislature took the first step in Section 5 of SBX 2 11 by recognizing that payments from counties and/or courts to judges were illegal and criminal by giving retroactive immunity from criminal prosecution to the governmental entities, officers and employees of governmental entities who paid or received county and/or court payments. This was a clear warning to the judges who received such payments to not run for another term as the immunity did not exist for any payments after May 21, 2009. Now the terms of all the judges who eligible for retroactive immunity under Section 5 of SBX 2 11 have expired as of January 1, 2013.
No current immunity exists for any judge receiving county and/or court payments and no retroactive immunity existed from impeachment for “misconduct in office” under Article 4, Section 18 (a) and (d) of the California Constitution.
The Superior Court judges, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court justices who received such payments from counties appearing in cases or appeals before them, have routinely refused to disqualify themselves from such cases and appeals to this day, despite constitutional provisions, statutes and case precedent mandating such disqualification.
The Legislature recognized the “misconduct of the judges” by enacting Section 5 of SBX 2 11 which stated:
“Section 5. Nothwithstanding any other law, no governmental entity, or officer or employee of a governmental entity, shall incur any liability or shall be subject to prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of this act on the ground that those benefits were not authorized under law.” (Emphasis added.)
Unfortunately, at such time, the Legislature due to the three day rush of enacting SBX 2 11, neglected to consider the continued violations of U.S and California Constitutional provisions and laws, the negative effect upon the public interest, the due administration of justice and the integrity of the California judicial system by not also enacting remedial legislation to remove the judges who engaged in the judicial misconduct and also preclude further judicial misconduct in the future.
Inherent in this problem is the fact that all of the decisions made by the judges in cases in which counties or courts which paid the judges were a party to the case, a witness in the case or a party interested in the case were void, due to “fraud upon the court”. This fact will continue to exist and continue to destroy the administration of justice in California if the Legislation is not enacted.
Enacting the Legislation will cure this problem and accomplish the goal of restoring the due administration of justice, integrity in the judiciary and the balance of power between the branches of government set forth in Article 4, Section 18 (a) and (b) of the California Constitution under which the Legislature ultimately bears the responsibility to ensure the integrity of the Judicial Branch, when the judges have engaged in “misconduct in office” as occurred here.
III. Reasons for the Legislation.
The reasons for the legislation are as follows:
(1) Section 2 of SBX 2 11(Cal. Govt. Code Section 68220) which mandated counties to continue paying judges currently in office county benefits on the same terms and conditions that existed on July 1, 2008, expired under its own language and is moot because all of the judges who were in office as of May 21, 2009 (the effective date of SBX 2 11) who received county benefits as of July 1, 2008, are no longer current judges as the last of their terms of office expired as of January 1, 2013;
(2) Section 2 of SBX 2 11(Cal. Govt. Code Section 68220) also “authorized” but did not “prescribe” “counties to elect to provide benefits for all judges in the county”, while acknowledging that: (1) such benefits were criminal as set forth in Section 5 of SBX 2 11; and (2) the county officers and employees who paid such benefits to the judges and the judges who took such benefits were not receiving any immunity from liability, prosecution or disciplinary action as such were limited to retroactive immunity as set forth in Section 5 of SBX 2 11;
(3) Judges elected to office after July 1, 2008 were not eligible to receive supplemental judicial benefits provided by the county or court, or both, as of July 1, 2008;
(4) Section 5 of SBX 2 11 which provided governmental entities, and officers and employees of governmental entities retroactive immunity from liability, prosecution, and disciplinary action as of the effective date of SBX 2 11 because of benefits provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of this act on the ground that those benefits were not authorized under law, did not extend to protecting the public interest, the due administration of justice and the integrity of the judiciary and county government by setting forth the protections that the public would receive if the prosecutions and the convictions occurred with the results was that county officers and employees who authorized and gave criminal payments to the judges, and the judges who received the county criminal payments, would have been removed from office and prohibited from holding any other office under Cal. Penal Code Section 98 and the District Attorney being required to prosecute the judges to recover all illegal payments plus 20% under Cal. Govt. Code Section 26525;
(5) By violating the U.S. and California Constitutions and laws, each of the judges and justices who received county payments was subject to impeachment and conviction under Article 4, Section 18 (a) and (b) of the California Constitution for “misconduct in office” resulting in their “removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the State”.
(6) Section 6 of SBX 2 11 which required the Judicial Council to report to the Senate Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review, the Assembly Committee on Budget, and both the Senate and Assembly Committees on Judiciary on or before December 31, 2009, analyzing the statewide benefits inconsistencies did not require annual updates. Such report showed that approximately 90% of the judges received illegal payments from approximately thirty counties and courts as of 2008. No subsequent study occurred. It is necessary to annually update the 2009 report to the public on the integrity of the California judicial system and judiciary;
(7) Despite the fact that the county and court payments to judges were illegal and not subject to immunity after the effective date of SBX 2 11, approximately twenty five counties and courts continue such criminal payments with over $350 million of criminal payments having been made to California judges during the last twenty five years;
(8) These criminal payments resulted in the largest judicial scandal in history and made the California judicial system and the California judiciary one of the most corrupt in history, particularly as the illegality and corruption were recognized and approved by the granting of retroactive immunity from liability, prosecution and disciplinary action in Section 5 of SBX 2 11with the State Assembly effectively impeaching the judges and the Senate effectively convicting them and entering judgment after enacting Section 5 of SBX 2 11;
(9) A further result of the illegal and criminal payments was and is, that all decisions made by the judges and justices in cases before such judge or justice, in which the county or court which made such payment to the judge or justice, are void and null for the reason of the actions of the judicial officer and the county and or court being a “fraud upon the court”;
(10) Since: (1) Sections 1 and 2 of SBX 2 11(Cal. Govt. Code Section 68220) are expired and moot; (2) the Legislature recognized the misconduct of the judges in Section 5 of SBX 2 11by granting retroactive immunity and effectively impeached, convicted and entered judgment against the judges who received retroactive immunity; (3) the criminal payments from counties and courts continue as of the present day resulting in the continued corruption of the Judicial branch of the California Government, it is imperative that the legislation be immediately enacted.
IV. The County and/or Court Payments to Judges Violate U.S. and California Constitutions and Law and Are “Misconduct in Office” of a Judge Under California Constitution Article 4, Section 18 (a) and (b).
In 2008, the decision of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 640, (4th Appellate District, Div. One, October, 2008) Rev. Denied 12/23/2008 (Sturgeon I) held that the county payments to Superior Court judges were “compensation” and violated Article 6, Section 19 of the California Constitution which states that the Legislature shall “prescribe” the compensation of the judges.
In Sturgeon I, supra, the court stated at 167 Cal.App.4th at 635:
“Section 19, article VI of the California Constitution requires that the Legislature “prescribe compensation for judges of courts of record.” The duty to prescribe judicial compensation is not delegable. Thus the practice of the County of Los Angeles (the county) of providing Los Angeles County superior court judges with employment benefits, in addition to the compensation prescribed by the Legislature, is not permissible. Accordingly, we must reverse an order granting summary judgment in favor of the county in an action brought by a taxpayer who challenged the validity of the benefits the county provides to its superior court judges.” (Emphasis added.)
At page 654 the court further stated:
“We have been unable to identify any enactment of the Legislature which prescribes the judicial benefits the county pays its judges.” (Emphasis added.)
The court concluded at pages 656-657:
“Both section 69894.3 and the audit and credit procedures set forth in Lockyer-Isenberg are also ineffective as legislative prescriptions. They do not require the payment of benefits, let alone set any standard or safeguard which regulate the size or the conditions under which they should be paid. In giving the county’s the option of providing the benefits, and no limitation on the kind and amount of those benefits, these statutes in no sense set a fundamental policy with respect to benefits, provide any standard for applying such a policy, or contain any safeguards which would insure that benefits are consistent with the Legislature’s adopted policy. Indeed, without violating section 69894.3, or Lockyer-Isenberg, the county could, in any given year, deprive its judges of MegaFlex benefits and continue to provide them to other employees.
Admittedly, in one respect Lockyer-Isenberg goes beyond section 69894.3 and its own audit and credit procedures. As we have noted, in section 3, subdivision (g) of Lockyer-Isenberg, the Legislature expressed its intention that no court personnel employed as of July 1, 1997, suffer any reduction in salary or benefits as a “result of this act.” (Stats. 1997, ch. 850, § 3.) As to court personnel, including judges, serving as of July 1, 1997, an argument can be made that this provision of Lockyer-Isenberg set a floor on the benefits to which those judges were entitled. This provision nonetheless would not bring the county’s benefits program within the requirements of the Constitution. First, by its terms section 3 of Lockyer-Isenberg only applies to judges serving as of July 1, 1997. We would have to ignore its express provisions to extend its protection to judges who began their service after July 1, 1997. There is also the difficulty posed by the last phrase of section 3, “as a result of this act.” That phrase undermines our ability to conclude that by way of Lockyer-Isenberg, the Legislature intended to affirmatively prescribe benefits for superior court judges. However, these defects are relatively minor compared with the absence in Lockyer-Isenberg of any standard or inherent safeguard by which future increases or decreases in judicial benefits would be regulated. The fact the county itself has elected to tie its judicial benefits to the benefits it provides other salaried employees is not a substitute for a legislative mandate that it do so.
Because the benefits provided by the county are compensation within the meaning of section 19, article VI of our Constitution, and because this record does not establish those benefits have been prescribed by the Legislature, the trial court erred in granting the county’s motion for summary judgment.11
Judgment reversed. Appellant to recover his costs of appeal.” (Emphasis added.)
In response, the Legislature enacted and the Governor signed SBX 2 11 on February 20, 2009, effective May 21, 2009. In 2010, the decision of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 191 Cal.App.4th 344 (4th Appellate District, Div. One, December 10, 2010), Rev. Denied 3/16/11 (Sturgeon II) held that Sections 1 and 2 of SBX 2 11, enacted as California Government Code Section 68220 were only a “temporary solution” to the problem of the illegality of the county payments. The California Court of Appeal reaffirmed its position in Sturgeon II, supra, in which it upheld SBX 2 11 as an interim response to the earlier Sturgeon decision and denying that SBX 2 11 is “ a permanent response to either the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I or the difficult problem of adopting a compensation scheme that deals with varying economic circumstances in an equitable and efficient manner.”
The court stated at 191 Cal.App.4th at 344:
“This is the second time this case has reached us on appeal. In our first opinion, Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008), 167 Cal.App.4th 630, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 (Sturgeon I ), we reaffirmed the principle that judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. We found that by providing substantial employment benefits to its superior court judges, defendant County of Los Angeles (the county) violated article VI, section 19 of our Constitution, which requires that compensation for judges be prescribed by the Legislature.” (Emphasis added.)
The court concluded at pages 355-366 :
“However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to either the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I or the difficult problem of adopting a compensation scheme that deals with varying economic circumstances in an equitable and efficient manner. Thus, we would be remiss in discharging our duties if we did not state that while the Legislature’s interim response to Sturgeon I defeats the particular challenges asserted by Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy, if not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. We are confident that the Legislature within a reasonable period of time will act to adopt a uniform statewide system of judicial compensation.” (Emphasis added.)
The Legislature did not act and Sections 1 and 2 of SBX 2 11 became moot.
Sturgeon II only addressed limited challenges to SBX 2 11 and did not address Section 5 of SBX 2 11 which gave retroactive immunity from civil liability, criminal prosecution and disciplinary action to government officials [including judges] on account of the giving or receiving of county payments.
Neither Sturgeon I, nor Sturgeon II, addressed the underlying issue previously decided by California precedent that payments to a judge by a party to a case or his lawyer were cause for removal of the judge from office. (Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 8 Cal.4th 630 (1994) (Adams I) and Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 10 Cal.4th 866, (July 20, 1995) Rehearing Denied 9/14/1995 (Adams II)).
Adams II held that when a judge accepted gifts, financial benefits and favors from attorneys and a litigant appearing in the judge’s court, this required disqualification with respect to matters involving these attorneys or their firms, pages 879, 913-914 citing Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 8 Cal.4th 630, 661-663 (1994) (Adams I) which stated these acts represented “… conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute..”.
Such payments violated Cal. Penal Code Sections 7(6), 92, 93, 94, 96.5, and 182(a) (5) amongst others, U.S.C. Sections 4, 241, 1513, 1846, and 1960 et seq., amongst others, California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) and California Code of Judicial Ethics, Canons 2A, 3E(1) and (2), 4D(1) and 6A.
In particular, the violation of federal criminal law, 18 U.S.C. – the intangible right to honest services, based upon the California Bribery Statute (Cal. Penal Code, Section 7(6)) was addressed in the cases of U.S. v. Frega, U.S. v. Malkus and U.S. v. Adams, 179 F.3d 793 (1999). The court held that the payment by a party and an attorney appearing before a judge to such judge is bribery and violates 18 U.S.C. Section 1346- the intangible right to honest services. The court stated at 179 F.3d at 805-807 in relevant part:
“Because no linkage of payment and specific official act is required under California law and because the indictment incorporates the relevant state bribery statutes, which, in turn, state the elements of the bribery offenses, the indictment is valid in this respect.”
In Skilling v. United States, 561U.S.40, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (Decided June 24, 2010), the U.S. Supreme Court held at 130 S.Ct. at 2931 that 18 S.C. Section 1346 “criminalizes only the bribe and kick-back core of the pre- McNally case law”, leaving in place the holding of U.S. v. Frega, supra.
The First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution guarantee access to the courts, and due process respectively.
Pursuant to Article 6, Cl. 2, of the U.S. Constitution, state judges are bound to follow the U.S. Constitution and the laws of the United States. Article 6, Cl. 2 states in relevant part:
“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
Article 1, Sections 3 and 7 of the California Constitution guarantee the rights of access to the courts and due process, respectively.
These constitutional rights and cases were settled law, long before the decision in Sturgeon I, which was limited to California Constitution Article 6, Section 19. Even more egregious, the Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 4D (1) specifically prohibited a judge from taking any payments from a person appearing or likely to appear in the court where the judge sits.
Based upon the aforementioned violations of law and the recognition of such in Section 5 of SBX 2 11, impeachment, conviction and entry of judgment against the judges who received retroactive immunity under Section 5 of SBX 2 11 should have occurred in 2009 and subsequent impeachments, convictions and entries of judgment against the judges who received and are receiving judicial benefits payments from counties and/or courts should have occurred and should be occurring now.
California Constitution Article 4, Section 18 (a) and (b) states:
“SEC. 18. (a) The Assembly has the sole power of impeachment.
Impeachments shall be tried by the Senate. A person may not be
convicted unless, by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two thirds
of the membership of the Senate concurs.
b) State officers elected on a statewide basis, members of the
State Board of Equalization, and judges of state courts are subject
to impeachment for misconduct in office. Judgment may extend only to
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
State, but the person convicted or acquitted remains subject to
criminal punishment according to law.” (Emphasis added.)
The Legislation solves the problem by accomplishing the same results as the impeachment process through legislation, given the decision by the Legislature in Section 5 of SBX 2 11 that the county and/or court payments to judges were criminal by giving retroactive immunity from criminal prosecution for the giving and/or receiving of such payments while the judges were in office and the vote of the Legislature on SBX 2 11 which effectively impeached, convicted and entered judgment for “misconduct in office” against the judges and justices who were given the retroactive immunity under Section 5 of SBX 2 11.
V. All Decisions, Orders and Judgments Entered by Judges and Justices who Received Payments from Counties and/or Courts Appearing Before Them as Parties, Witnesses or Interested Parties Are Void and Null.
There is no question that the receiving of illegal and criminal payments by judges or justices from counties and/or courts which were appearing before them as parties in the case, witnesses or interested parties both disqualified the judges and justices from presiding in the case and voided and annulled every order and judgment rendered by such judges and justices.
In U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61(1878), the U.S. Supreme Court stated at 98 U.S. at 66:
“Mr. Wells, in his very useful work on Res Adjudicata, says, sect. 499: ‘Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a contract.” (Emphasis added.)
“Extrinsic fraud is a broad concept that ‘tends to encompass almost any set of circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing’ ” Estate of Sanders v. Sutton, 40 Cal.3d 607, 614 (1985).
Case law has long held that “…any act of a disqualified judge is absolutely void whenever brought into question. A judgment rendered by such a judge is open to attack at any time.” In re Henry C., 161 Cal.App.3d 646, 652 (1985) citing T.P.B. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal.App.3d 881, 886 (1977). In Rossco Holdings Inc. v. Bank of America, 149 Cal.App.4th 1353 (2007), 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 141, the court stated at page 148:
“Orders made by a disqualified judge are void. (Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy (1932),214 Cal. 562, 6 P.2d 944;Christie v. City of El Centro (2006),135 Cal.App.4th 767, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 718.) There is a dispute in recent appellate authority as to whether such orders should be considered void or only voidable at the option of a party; the Supreme Court’s latest opinion on the matter held them to be void. (Christie v. City of El Centro, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 769-780, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 718.)….”[Disqualification occurs when the facts creating disqualification arise, not when the disqualification is established.” (Christie v. City of El Centro, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 776, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 718.) “[I]t is the fact of disqualification that controls, not subsequent judicial action on that disqualification.” (Id. at p. 777, 37 Cal. Rptr.3d 718.) (Emphasis added.)
In Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920), the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that no court could validate a void judgment at 254 U.S. at 353-354:
“Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot beyond the power delegated to them If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” (Citations omitted) (Emphasis added.)
Vallely, supra, was cited in American Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534 (6th Cir., 2007) in which the court stated at page 539:
“Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot [go] beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal. Vallely v. N. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353-354; 41 S.Ct. 116; 65 L.Ed 297 (1920)’
The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment. …. ” (Emphasis in original.)
The U.S. Supreme Court decision of Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) required the circuit court to decide the issue of fraud when it was defrauded stating at 322 U.S. at 248-251:
“Equitable relief against fraudulent judgments is not of statutory creation. It is a judicially devised remedy fashioned to relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard and fast adherence to another court-made rule, the general rule that judgments should not be disturbed after the term of their entry has expired. Created to avert the evils of archaic rigidity, this equitable procedure has always been characterized by flexibility which enables it to meet new situations which demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary to correct the particular injustices involved in these situations. …..
We think that when this Court, a century ago, approved this practice and held that federal appellate courts have the power to pass upon, and hence to grant or deny, petitions for bills of review even though the petitions be presented long after the term of the challenged judgment has expired, it settled the procedural question here involved. Southard v. Russell, 16 How. 547, 14 L.Ed. 1052. 4 ……We hold, therefore, that the Circuit Court on the record here presented5 had both the duty and the power to vacate its own judgment and to give the District Court appropriate directions.” (Emphasis added.)
In California, there is no time limit or reasonable diligence requirement for an attack on a void judgment; the attack may be made at any time. (Heidary v. Yadollahi, 99 Cal.App.4th 857 (2002); Plotitsa v. Superior Court, 140 Cal.App.3d 755 (1983).)
The recent 9th Circuit case of United States v. Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, (9th Cir. 2011) defined fraud upon the court to encompass the actions of judicial officers that “harmed the integrity of the judicial process” or “defile the court.” The 9th Circuit stated at page 443 in relevant part:
“In determining whether fraud constitutes fraud on the court, the relevant inquiry is not whether fraudulent conduct “prejudiced the opposing party,” but whether it ” ‘harm[ed]’ the integrity of the judicial process.” Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F2d.421, 424 (9th Cir. 1989). Fraud on the court involves “far more than an injury to a single litigant.” Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246.
[T]he inquiry as to whether a judgment should be set aside for fraud upon the court under Rule 60(b) focuses not so much in terms of whether the alleged fraud prejudiced the opposing party but more in terms of whether the alleged fraud harms the integrity of the judicial process . . .In re Intermagnetics America, Inc., 926 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1991).
“Fraud on the court” should, we believe, embrace only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.
In re Intermagnetics America, Inc., 926 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1991). (quoting 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice f 60.33, at 515 (2d ed. 1978)).”
……… Some courts and commentators have suggested that perjury should not usually constitute fraud on the court unless “an attorney or other officer of the court was a party to it.” 11 Wright & Miller § 2870.” (Emphasis added.)
VI. Disclosure of Personal Involvement with the “Misconduct in Office” of the Judges.
I am: (1) the Chairman of the Campaign for Judicial Integrity (website- campaignforjudicialintegrity.org); (2) a strategic consultant specializing in judicial corruption and anti –corruption amongst other things (website- richardfinelaw.com); and (3) a victim of the “misconduct in office” by judges who received “county benefits” from counties which were appearing before them as parties in cases in which I was representing the opposing party, while I was practicing law and at present. Attached hereto is a short resume.
I was the first attorney to expose the illegal county payments to judges. This was accomplished in appellate court briefs commencing in 2000-2001, two federal civil rights lawsuits in 2002, and disqualifications of judges commencing in 2002.
The LA Superior Court judges retaliated by deciding every case in the LA Superior Court against my client and me, filing two false complaints with the State Bar of California seeking my disbarment in 2003 and 2004, respectively, and illegally incarcerating me for eighteen (18) in coercive solitary confinement in the LA County jail from March 4, 2009 until September 17, 2010 on a false contempt of court charge.
Unbeknownst to me and concealed from all federal courts, commencing at some point prior to 2002, the approximate 430 LA Superior Court judges and personnel of the LA Superior Court developed a “visceral hatred” against me, sought “revenge” against me, sought to “keep him [me] quiet” and “out of circulation” for my bringing cases about the illegal county payments to the LA Superior Court judges and keeping the issue at the forefront.
This conspiracy and concert of action of the LA Superior Court judges and personnel remained concealed until December 5, 2012 when Alan Parachini, the former Public Information Officer of the LA Superior Court admitted to the actions of the LA Superior Court in an interview with Leslie Dutton of the Full Disclosure Network. The full interview is online at fulldisclosure.net and a transcript is in my possession and available.
The Parachini interview showed that the judges and personnel of the LA Superior Court, the California Supreme Court, the justices of the California Supreme Court and their attorney Kevin McCormick committed fraud upon court in any case in which they were involved with me from the outset of the case through the present, by concealing from me, the U.S. District Court, the 9th Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court the fact that the judges and personnel of the LA Superior Court and in particular Judge David P. Yaffe (who presided over the unlawful contempt proceeding and ordered the unlawful coercive, solitary confinement in the LA County Jail) were incapable of being objective or impartial to me and were “embroiled with me ” because:
(1) the judges had a “visceral hatred” against Richard I. Fine (Fine) commencing prior to 2002 and continuing through the present (Emphasis added.);
(2) the judges “were so intent on doing whatever they could to damage Mr. Fine that overcame common sense that one might have expected” (Emphasis added.);
(3) “it was clear from weeks before Judge Yaffe sentenced Mr. Fine that that was what was going to happen”;
(4) “it became a vindictive action that was maintained simply because of the enmity of the judges” (Emphasis added.);
(5) “it was about getting back at him [Fine] and wanting to keep him quiet” (Emphasis added.);
(6) “First there were many orders that Yaffe had apparently made or intended to make that he had never signed so they had never acquired the status of valid court orders…… there were orders that were signed and never served on Mr. Fine”;
(7) “So the file was a mess and so there came a point where a decision was made at the court leadership level that a way had to be found to ease Yaffe out of the case and get Fine out of jail.”;
(8) “Well the plan was that he [Judge Yaffe] would retire in November and that immediately upon Judge Yaffe’s retirement a new judge would be assigned to the case and it was even determined who it would be, and that judge would find that there was no longer any purpose to be served by Mr. Fine’s confinement and order him released.”;
(9) “For whatever reason Judge Yaffe himself upset that plan by deciding to release Mr. Fine on his own.”
(10) “And I believe that the order was written by Fred Bennett [LA Superior Court Counsel] as were so many different orders in many different cases. They were written by Bennett with multiple objectives, one of which often was to extricate the court from a difficult political situation.” (Emphasis added.);
(11) “ …….the whole thing, … comes down to the deep anger harbored by hundreds of judges toward Mr. Fine caused by his insistence that the legislature and the courts keep focused on the benefits issue.” (Emphasis added.);
(12) “There is a one page contract between the court [and] the Board of Supervisors that says these benefits will be paid. And the benefits are tied to the benefits the supervisors get so if the supervisors voted to remove the benefits from the judges they would then have to figure out how to keep their own benefits because the two are inextricably linked in this contract.” (Emphasis added.);
(13) “What separates him [Fine] really is that he has gotten under the skin of judges. And I don’t think, I didn’t then think and I don’t think now, that that is sufficient reason to go after Mr. Fine the way the judges did, and certainly no reason to hold him effectively a political prisoner for a year and a half.” (Emphasis added.);
(14) “It shouldn’t have been allowed to happen. Yaffe should have voluntarily recused himself from the case, certainly after the contempt trial which was – I’ve seen a lot of courtrooms, and I’ve never seen anything like that happen. ……….. Judge Yaffe had succumbed to his own personal enmity and the extreme dislike of most of his colleagues for Mr. Fine, and saw himself as the instrument through which revenge could be sought against this annoying guy who had kept after the court over benefits for so many years……..” (Emphasis added.);
(15) “Revenge. It’s that simple. The judges wanted revenge. They wanted Mr. Fine out of circulation and they had the power to do it and did it.” (Emphasis added.);
(16) “There were e mails and memos indicating to both security personnel, the Sheriff’s people and to court personnel that anytime Mr. Fine was seen in the Mosk Courthouse, or anywhere else in the system, but most often he was in the Mosk Courthouse, that his presence was to be made known to the security people immediately. Now, Richard Fine was not then and I cannot imagine is now someone who is a physical danger to the safety of anybody in the courthouse. Mr. Fine is not a violent, threatening person.” (Emphasis added.);
(17) “So he was a name in a truly unique category as far as the court was concerned he was to be treated as a serious enemy of the court under all circumstances…” (Emphasis added.);
(18) “ …… But there are more than a small number of judges who don’t see it that way, and were eager to see as much punishment meted out to Richard Fine as possible.” (Emphasis added.); and
(19) “….. If anything he [Yaffe] was doing what he himself thought Mr. Fine deserved and what his colleagues and friends kept urging him to do and kept telling him was what Mr. Fine deserved.” .
These actions of the LA Superior Court judges required the recusal of the LA Superior court judges and in particular Judge Yaffe under the due process clause as the LA Superior Court judges and Judge Yaffe were “embroiled in a running bitter controversy” with one of the litigants and the lawyer for one of the litigants as set forth under Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971).
These actions of the LA Superior Court judges required the recusal of the LA Superior court judges and in particular Judge Yaffe under the due process clause as the judges and Judge Yaffe were a “judge in his own case” and “trying a case where he has an interest in the outcome.” as set forth in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955).
These actions disqualified every state court judge and temporary judge from sitting as a judge under CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) and (B) in the cases set forth in the State Bar Notice of Disciplinary Charges (NDC) thereby removing the basis for every count in the NDC as there was not any judge against whom Fine was charged with filing documents in court.
These actions also violated federal criminal law in particular, 18 U.S.C. Sections 4, 241 and 1315 and California Penal Code Sections 96.6 and 182(a)(5).
The U.S. District Court did not address these actions in any of its decisions due to the fraud upon the court by Respondents Sheriff of LA County, the LA Superior Court and Judge Yaffe and their counsel Kevin McCormick in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Case of Fine v. Sheriff of LA County et al., USDC Case No. CV 09-01914, 9th Circuit Appeal No. 09-56073 and the fraud upon the court by Defendants California Supreme Court and the Justices of the California Supreme Court and their counsel Kevin McCormick in the case of Fine v. State Bar et al., USDC Case No. 2:10-00048 JST CW, 9th Circuit Appeal No. 12-55706.
Had the District Court been aware of these actions it would have been bound by the U.S. Supreme Court precedents of Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra, and In re Murchison, supra, to immediately grant the Writ of Habeas Corpus and allow the First Amended Complaint.
The 9th Circuit did not address these actions in its decision due to the fraud upon the court by Respondents Sheriff of LA County, the LA Superior Court and Judge Yaffe and their counsel Kevin McCormick. The 9th Circuit specifically stated in its decision:
“Nor was Judge Yaffe so “personally embroiled” that he could not preside impartially. Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007)”
Had the 9th Circuit been aware of these actions, it would have been bound by its own
precedent of Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) and the U.S. Supreme Court precedents of Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra, and In re Murchison, supra, to reverse the District Court decision denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and grant the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The 9th Circuit did not address these actions in its decision to affirm the dismissal of the First Amended Complaint in of Fine v. Sheriff of LA County et al., USDC Case No. CV 09-01914, 9th Circuit Appeal No. 09-56073 as it was not aware of these actions due to the fraud upon the court by Defendants California Supreme Court and the Justices of the California Supreme Court and their counsel Kevin McCormick.
Had the 9th Circuit been aware of these actions, it would have been required to reverse the dismissal and allowed an amended complaint to be filed.
The 2003 State Bar complaint was dismissed before trial by the State Bar “in the furtherance of justice” after I moved for dismissal.
The 2004 State Bar complaint became a 2006 NDC which resulted in a false order for involuntary enrollment in 2007 and a false disbarment in 2009. On August 30, 2011, the State Bar admitted in a Reply Brief in the 9th Circuit in the case of Fine v. State Bar et al., 9th Circuit Appeal No. 1255706 that the 2009 disbarment did not occur for the reasons stated by the State Bar Court Review Department but for my challenging the county payments to the judges.
The State Bar stated at California State Bar Reply page 6, ln. 9-11 as follows:
“Finally, Fine insists that Senate Bill SBX 2 11 is unlawful. That issue, of course, has nothing to do with Fine beyond his personal crusade against such benefits (mostly through frivolous lawsuits, which is why he was disbarred). (Emphasis added.)”
No state court of record or federal court held any lawsuit filed by me challenging the county payments to be “frivolous”, nor could they based upon binding federal and state case law precedent.
The State Bar reaffirmed its position that the disbarment was a fraud by electing to fail to oppose my:
(1) December 5, 2011 Motion in the California Supreme Court to Set Aside the Void March 13, 2009 Order of Disbarment on the Grounds of Fraud Upon the Court based upon the State Bar’s August 30, 2011 admission in Fine v. State Bar et al., 9th Circuit Appeal No. 1255706 that the Disbarment was based upon Fine’s filing federal cases challenging illegal county payments to judges which reason was not a count in the Notice of Disciplinary Charges upon which the Disbarment was recommended; and
(2) January 7, 2013 Motion in the California Supreme Court to Set Aside the Void
March 13, 2009 Order of Disbarment on the Grounds of Fraud Upon the Court based upon the admission of Alan Parachini, the former Public Information Officer of the LA Superior Court that the judges of the LA Superior Court had a “visceral hatred” against Fine and wanted “revenge” against him and to “keep him quiet” and “out of circulation” for his bringing cases about the illegal county payments and keeping the issue at the forefront.
California Rules of Court (CRC) Rule 8.54© states:
“A failure to oppose a motion may be deemed consent to the granting of the motion.”
There is no question that the State Bar was fully aware of CRC Rule 8.54© when it elected to not oppose the motions and that it consciously decided to not oppose the motions.
Despite the admonition of CRC Rule 8.54©, the justices of the California Supreme Court summarily denied each motion.
Court documents show that based upon the time that various Supreme Court justices were Superior Court judges and the historic record of illegal county and court payments the California Supreme Court justices who either denied my Petition for Review of the October 17, 2007 State Bar Hearing Department Order of Involuntary Enrollment, the September 19, 2008 State Bar Review Department Recommendation of Disbarment, or the December 5, 2011 and January 7, 2013 motions were disqualified to sit as they had a bias against me, an interest to “keep me quiet” and “out of circulation” and/or an interest to protect themselves and other judges who received illegal payments and received retroactive immunity from criminal prosecution for such under Section 5 of SBX 2 11.
Former Chief Justice George and Associate Justices Chin, Corrigan, Kennard and Former Associate Justice Moreno who denied the Petitions for Review each received illegal and criminal payments from counties while they were Superior Court judges based upon a comparison of their service as Superior Court judges and county or court payments. Further former Chief Justice George and Associate Justice Baxter were members of the California Judicial Council who drafted SBX 2 11.
The California Supreme Court justices also manifested this bias by summarily denying my petition for a writ of habeas corpus which challenged Judge David P. Yaffe’s right to sit on the case of Marina Strand Colony II Homeowners Association v. County of Los Angeles, et al., LASC Case No. BS 109420 and hold me in contempt after Judge Yaffe admitted and testified that he received payments from LA County. Such bias and interest was the illegality of the county or court payments which the justices received and their attempt to keep such issue away from public scrutiny as did the LA Superior Court judges.
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye who received retroactive immunity under Section 5 of SBX 2 11 and Associate Justices Chin, Corrigan, Kennard and Baxter were five of the seven justices that denied the December 11, 2011 and January 7, 2013 motions.
All of these actions constituted “misconduct in office” under California Constitution Article 4, Section 18 (a) and (b) subjecting the LA Superior Court judges, the Court of Appeal justices and the California Supreme Court justices who engaged in these actions to impeachment, conviction and entry of judgment resulting in their removal from office and preclusion from further holding as State elected office, in addition to criminal charges and disciplinary action.
All of these decisions were void as a “fraud upon the court” by a judicial officer.
VII. The Judicial Branch Demonstrated that It Is Both Incapable and Unwilling to Rectify the Conduct of the Judges and Justices who Received Retroactive Immunity Pursuant to Section 5 of SBX 2 11 or Who Are Currently Receiving Illegal and Criminal County and /or Court Payments and Further Retaliated Against Others Who Challenged the Illegal County and /or Court Payments to Judges By Denying Them Due Process.
Despite the lack of immunity for the county and/or court illegal and criminal payments to judges since May 21, 2009 (the effective date of SBX 2 11), the Commission on Judicial Performance, established under Article 6 which is the Judicial Branch under the California Constitution, has not removed one judge or justice from office for receiving payments from a party or litigant appearing before him/her as required by the precedents of Adams I and II.
The judges and justices did not, and do not report the county and/or court payments on their Form 700 Financial Disclosure Reports even though such payments were held to be “compensation” from counties who are not the employers of the judges, as the judges are constitutional state elected officers.
The judges and justices did not, and do not disclose the county payments to them to litigants opposing counties who paid them in cases and appeals in which the judges or justices are presiding and disqualify themselves from the case or appeal in violation of CCP Section 170.1(a) (6) (A) (iii) and (B) and Code of Judicial Ethics 2 A and B, 3E (1) and (2), 4D (1).
The judges and justices retaliate against litigants who challenge their illegal actions by refusing to disqualify themselves, thereby denying the challenger due process and issuing void decisions against the challenger.
The recent “Not to Be Published” Opinion of the 4th Appellate District, Division 3 in the case of William Donald Goble, Petitioner/Appellant v. Brenda K. Fuller, Respondent/Respondent and Orange County Department of Child Support Services, Intervener/Respondent, Appeal No. G046403, Orange County Superior Court No. 97P003581, filed March 7, 2013, demonstrated that the judges and justices retaliate against any person who challenges the illegal and criminal county payments to judges, by refusing to disqualify themselves, denying due process and issuing void decisions.
The record in the case demonstrates the retaliation of the judges. The record shows that Goble brought two motions in the trial court. The first motion was filed December 2, 2011. (AA No. 2) It sought an order to “Set Aside All Void Orders and Judgments of Custody, Child Support and Restraining Orders against William D. Goble”.
The grounds for the motion were extrinsic fraud upon the court consisting of the concealment of payments by Orange County (DCSS), an Intervener in the case, to the state Superior Court judges who entered orders and judgments in the case.
The first motion was not opposed by either Respondent or Intervener DCSS.
The second motion was filed December 20, 2012. (AA No. 4) It sought an order to “Set Aside Void Orders of October 18, 2011 and November 22, 2011 Against William D. Goble Entered by Commissioner Duane T. Neary”.
The grounds for the motion were extrinsic fraud upon the court, obstruction
of justice and corruption consisting of Commissioner Neary entering such orders while knowing that he did not have jurisdiction: (1) as no stipulation for him to serve as a temporary judge was executed either orally or in writing on May 11, 2011 during the first telephonic appearance before him by Appellant; (2) a specific Notice of Non Stipulation was filed against him and any other “Temporary Judge” on October 13, 2011 prior to any other appearance before him; (3) Commissioner Neary deliberately made a false record in minute orders by stating that he apprised Appellant that he was a temporary judge and no objections to him serving as a temporary judge were raised during calendar call in a May 11, 2011 Minute Order, when Appellant was not even present on the phone during calendar call, and stating that the parties were apprised that he was a temporary judge and no one objected in an October 18, 2011 Minute Order when Appellant was not even present at court or by telephone; and (4) Commissioner Neary and the DCSS deliberately making false statements in the November 18, 2011 order to show cause stating that Appellant was present at the October 18, 2011 hearing when Appellant was not and stating that Appellant was aware of the October 18, 2011 order when Appellant was not, amongst other things.
The second motion was not opposed by either Respondent or Intervener DCSS.
In January, 2012, after the motions were filed, Commissioner Neary issued a false arrest warrant for Goble to appear at a contempt hearing, which Commissioner Neary knew he had no jurisdiction to hold because Commissioner Neary knew that he never had jurisdiction to hear Goble’s case on May 11, 2011, that lied in the November 22, 2011 order to show cause to appear in January, 2012 about Goble being present at the October 18, 2011 hearing when he knew that Goble was not present at such hearing.
The motions were heard on January 20, 2012. At the January 20, 2012 hearing on the motions, counsel for Intervener DCSS did not appear and counsel for Respondent did not oppose the motions, but only asked for a continuance which was denied.
At the January 20, 2011 hearing, Judge Hubbard, did not raise any substantive ground to deny the motions. Judge Hubbard admitted in open court that she was receiving payments from the County of Orange, refused to recuse herself and denied the motions on the grounds that were not stated in the minute order.
Goble appealed. The appeal was assigned to the 4th Appellate District, Division Three. Each of the justices in Division Three, Justices Aronson, Bedsworth and O’Leary, were former Superior Court judges who received illegal criminal payments from Orange County whole sitting on the Superior Court for the County of Orange and who received retroactive immunity under Section 5 of SBX 2 11. Goble moved to disqualify the justices based upon their having received the payments from Orange County, a party to the appeal.
The justices refused to disqualify themselves and held that the payments to the judges were proper ignoring all binding U.S Supreme Court, California Supreme Court and other California precedents.
The justices argued that: (1) “Goble simply has not demonstrated a realistic, immediate possibility that the county will stop paying local judicial benefits to Superior Court judges if they render decisions unfavorable to the county. [citation]” citing to Silva v. County of Los Angeles, 215 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2002); and (2) “judge’s receipt of supplemental employment benefits from county, a party to the litigation, did not give judge “a ‘direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest’ in the matter. [citation]” citing to the “Not For Publication” Memorandum Decision in Fine v. Sheriff of Los Angeles County, (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2009, Appeal No. 09-56073) WL 4874116. (See fn. 1 and 2, page 12 of the Opinion)
The Opinion did not cite to any California case which supported those statements and the cases to which it did cite did not hold as stated in the Opinion.
The statement quoted from Silva, supra, was not the holding of the case, but only an irrelevant comment by the judge. The actual holding from the case was that Silva did not have “prudential standing” to bring the case. The comment from the judge in Silva, supra, was wrong and irrelevant. It did not follow the 9th Circuit precedent of Frega, supra, which the District Court judge was required to follow, and did not follow the state precedents of Adams I and II which the District Court was also required to follow. Further, after Silva, supra, Sturgeon I and II were decided ruling the payments unconstitutional under Article 6, Section 19 of the California Constitution.
The statement quoted from Fine, supra, also could not be used from the outset. As shown above, Fine, supra, was void due to the concealment of the “embroilment” of Judge Yaffe by the LA Superior Court, Judge Yaffe, their attorney Kevin McCormick and the Sheriff of Los Angeles County and his attorney. Further, the statement did not follow the 9th Circuit precedent of Frega, supra, or U.S. Supreme Court precedent of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208, (2009) setting forth the criterion for the denial of due process regarding payments to judges from parties appearing before them at 556 U.S. at 886:
“The failure to consider objective standards requiring recusal is not consistent with the imperatives of due process. We find that Blankenship’s significant and disproportionate influence—coupled with the temporal relationship between the election and the pending case—“ ‘ “offer a possible temptation to the average … judge to … lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.” ’ ” Lavoie, 475 U.S., at 825, 106 S.Ct. 1580 (quoting Monroeville, 409 U.S., at 60, 93 S.Ct. 80, in turn quoting Tumey, 273 U.S., at 532, 47 S.Ct. 437).” (Emphasis added.)
Goble has filed a Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court, Supreme Court Case No. S209874, where Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Associate Justices Chin, Corrigan, Kennard received retroactive immunity under Section 5 of SBX 2 11 based upon the time that they were Superior Court judges and Associate Justice Baxter was on the Judicial Council that wrote SBX 2 11.
The Legislation is immediately necessary to restore: (1) the due administration of law to the California Judicial System; (2) integrity to the Judicial Branch; (3) access to the courts; and (4) due process to the litigants. Unless the Legislation is enacted, Californians will continue to be deprived of a fair and honest judicial system providing them with constitutional protections and remain burdened by a corrupt Judicial Branch whose decisions are null and void.
Please sponsor the Legislation, circulate this letter and the Legislation, garner support for the Legislation and enact the Legislation with the same speed and majority as occurred with SBX 2 11.
Thank you for your consideration and support. I am available to testify and provide any assistance needed.
Richard I. Fine, PhD
Chairman, Campaign for Judicial Integrity